Hamida, a mother and chairperson of the water user committee recalls that before the system, the community collected unsafe water which they shared with animals, from a valley, 4 kilometres away.
Hamida affirms that there is no friction between them as nationals and refugees at the water point. The water user committee also includes refugees and all of them ensure the water system is well maintained, clean as well as encourage people to clean their water containers to avoid contamination. Hamida confirms that the local population has greatly benefitted from the refugees.
In Yoyo Health Centre III, Bidi Bidi refugee settlement, hundreds of patients arrive in the morning for health care services, majority of them, refugees. Eric Oguti, the In-charge confirms that the number of patients at the centre escalated since the arrival of the refugees. At the outpatient unit, 80 per cent of the patients received are refugees and those admitted make up 95 per cent.
Health in Sudan
Oguti stresses. At the Health Centre, UNICEF, through the district, supported the recruitment of health workers to support with the pressure from the refugees; supports immunization services; provided equipment like delivery beds, beds for patients in the paediatric and maternity wards; provides therapeutic milk and plumpy nut; supported the training of Village Health Team members in newborn care, among many other interventions.
To further support refugees live a dignified life, in , the United Nations and World Bank developed the Refugee and Host Population Empowerment ReHOPE strategy that will help refugees and host communities improve their living conditions as well as foster peaceful coexistence. UNICEF through its current Country Programme is contributing to the ReHOPE strategy by providing integrated social services and ensures the support inclusively addresses the rights and protection of refugees and host communities. For every child, the right to meaningful participation.
In Northern Uganda host communities and refugees coexist peacefully despite strained resources. Guma John Paul.
sudan an essay on disease in southern sudan and northern uganda Manual
Related Topics: Refugee and migrant children. Emergency relief and response. Water supply. More to explore. Photo Essay. See the story. Devices improve learning for children with disabilities. Read the story. Students with visual impairment excel in northern Uganda. While the war did not spark international outrage, and the first reports by human rights organizations were published in [viii] and [ix] the humanitarian disaster did belatedly generate a response.
Journalists visited the displaced camps in the summer of , alongside aid workers. Meanwhile, aid workers reported on death rates in the camps that were higher, by an order of magnitude, than those recorded in other famines of the s. The fact that internationally-donated aid had stood untouched in railway wagons for over a year, just yards from a camp where children were starving to death, caused outrage. This generated pressure on the government to allow relief to reach the famine victims, and in time led to the launch of Operation Lifeline Sudan OLS in January The presence of aid workers made it impossible for the slaughter to continue in secret.
Their platform was that the SPLA had been run in a dictatorial and incompetent manner.
This was the signature atrocity of a period of internecine killings that continued throughout the decade. But, as indicated above, it was different mainly in visibility rather than scale to what had gone before. The period of the most intense reciprocal ethnic killings came to an end in , through a political process of internal reconciliation. Under pressure from commanders, chiefs, religious leaders and a wide array of southern Sudanese, in the country and abroad, the SPLA leaders were pushed to reconcile.
It took some years for the key mutinous commanders to return to the fold, and other discontented commanders mutinied in the meantime—leading to a particularly vicious round of killing and starvation in —but the worst of the mass atrocities were over. The government of Sudan blocked outside access to South Kordofan part of northern Sudan in , and in the government began its declared jihad against the Nuba in the Nuba Mountains, which included both a major offensive against the SPLA, and a genocidal and ethnocidal campaign against the Nuba.
The Nuba are an ethnically diverse group, with religious practices ranging from Muslim to Christian to indigenous. International mujahideen trained local fighters for the jihad and a fatwa was issued in support of the cause. The purposes of the jihad were threefold: social transformation of the Nuba, counterinsurgency, and land grab. The social transformation aimed to Islamicize the Nuba and eradicate un-Islamic practices.
This aim ignored the fact that many of the Nuba were Muslim. To address this inconsistency, the fatwa issued declared Nuba Muslims to be apostates. The establishment of peace camps is perhaps the signature of this campaign; the Nuba were relocated to areas of Northern Kordofan, where it was expected they would serve as laborers. According to Komey, the sociocultural transformation that took place in the peace camps included the banning of indigenous religious practices, education which portrayed the Nuba as inferior to Arab culture, and manipulation of Nuba leaders through economic incentives.
The ending was related to three primary factors. First, lack of consensus was found at all levels within the Sudanese government and allied fighters. Vice President Zubeir was an opponent to the campaign, and Hassan al-Turabi never signed on to the fatwa that was issued for the jihad. Additionally, some of the foreign fighters refused to fight when the realized that some of the Nuba were Muslim.
Second, Sudanese communities were appalled at the conditions in which the Nuba were living when they saw the displaced Nuba in Northern Kordofan. Communities took it upon themselves to deliver food and medicine, and expressed their dissatisfaction with the conditions, contributing to the retreat of the militants. Third, resistance was perhaps the most decisive factor.
In , the SPLA was able to slow down the advance of government troops, and in May the government falsely declared they had won Tullishi Mountain and withdrew. War continued, though was intermittent, and the parties fought each other to a standstill. A ceasefire was signed in , brokered by the U.
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In , as the government made a major effort to control the oil-producing areas, [xi] violence returned to the areas that along the borders between Sudan and southern Sudan. After the majority of the local militia commanders defected and made alliances with the SPLA in , the government strategy changed to one of dispatching its own forces and northern militia to clear the oil producing areas, leading to the deaths of many thousands and the displacement of a further , However, estimates for total fatalities do not match those of other major episodes of mass atrocity.
The atrocities in Upper Nile subsided when the government had achieved its immediate military objectives, which were securing the area for oil production. The number of deaths caused by the war between southern-based insurgents, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army and the government of Sudan — is almost ubiquitously cited as causing the deaths of 2. The number stems primarily from the work of Millard Burr, a consultant for the U. Committee for Refugees. According to his testimony before U. After sifting through hundreds of documents and thousands of news reports, and after collecting hundreds of data points, I concluded that during the decade, at least 1.
Thus, no more than 1. A very rough estimate of civilian fatalities would suggest a minimum of , civilian direct deaths caused by violence. The Sudanese government itself states that between May and February , , Nuba were killed. The number of dead from other periods of heightened violence, like the Bor Massacre are sometimes documented, but mostly, the numbers for this conflict are very rough.
Sudan and now South Sudan have experienced decades of armed conflict with devastating impact on the civilian populations. Each phase of fighting has ended through mediation, followed by a short period of quiet, and then a new round of fighting, displacement and death. Mass atrocities in Sudan have no clear endings. Four times over the last thirty years, operations of this kind have killed tens of thousands of civilians, and caused hundreds of thousands to die from displacement, hunger and disease.
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Each episode of mass atrocity occurs for different reasons, including fear-driven counter-insurgency, ideological ambition, and clearing areas to seize their resources, but they resemble one another in their pattern of ethnically-targeted destruction of civilian communities. These episodes do not end clearly or decisively.
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Rather, killings diminish as the pattern of violence changes from a bipolar confrontation to fragmented or anarchic conflict. Sudanese live under the constant threat that war and mass atrocity may flare up again. Large-scale killings come to an end when the Sudanese Armed Forces SAF have achieved immediate military goals, but do not sustain the effort to decisive victory. The reasons for that inability include: a internal dissension among the ruling elite; b resistance from local rebels; and c resource and organizational constraints on sustaining a campaign.
Irrespective of the rationale for initiating the violence, the patterns of incomplete endings are similar. We code the mass atrocities in South Sudan as ending through moderation within domestic actors, under international pressure to negotiate an end to the conflict. The war produced no clear victor, hence we note that it had stalemated. We further note that a non-state actor, various Southern-based groups and militias allied to the government, were secondary perpetrators of atrocities.
Africa Watch. London: Africa Watch.